Strict protection of IPR can have a negative effect on economic development. Regression of economic growth on these indices produces conventional results (positive effect of stricter protection of IPR on growth) only if indices of institutional capacity (government effectiveness, control over corruption) are not included into the right hand side. If they are included, they kill the effect of IPR protection (because they are very much correlated with the IPR protection indices), so it is hardly possible to separate the effects of stricter IPR protection from the impact of the general strength of institutions.
IPR protection indices), so it is hardly possible to separate the effects of stricter IPR protection from the impact of the general strength of institutions.
The same procedure was used to evaluate the impact of the IPR protection regime on the average share of R&D expenditure in GDP and the results were largely the same: without control for the institutional capacity, IPR protection seems to stimulate R&D, but after controlling for the institutional indices the effect disappears.
There is also a strong negative effect of stricter regime of protection of IPR on the proliferation of the most crucial technology of recent decades -computers. The increase in the total number of PCs in 1995-2005, after controlling for the level of development, the size of the country and the institutional index, is negatively correlated with the IPR protection index.
If piracy of intellectual products allows to overcome the negative impact of IPR protection on the dissemination of new technologies, it is reasonable to talk not about costs of piracy, but about the benefits of piracy and the costs of stricter IPR protection.
The argument in favor of the patents is that granting monopoly rights to the inventor for a period of time stimulates inventions. The argument against patents is that this same monopoly rights inhibit innovations.
Today TRIPs (trade related intellectual property) rules that resulted from WTO agreements require the protection of patents for no less than 20 years and the protection of copyrights for no less than 50 years.
Does stricter IPR protection promote development? Review of theoretical debates
Despite popular beliefs, theoretical economists are not at all united in the support for stricter intellectual property rights. Patents and copyrights are granted to creators of intellectual products in order to ensure that they are rewarded and thus have stimuli to create these products. The assumption is that there is a market failure in the area of production of intellectual products that should be corrected by the intervention of the government. The general idea may be OK, but the implementation leaves a lot to be desired. Granting a monopoly on the use of inventions and artistic products is a very primitive way to stimulate the creator. As every monopoly, this one is associated with a lot of negative consequences, the major one being building barriers to the dissemination of intellectual products.
Stricter protection of the intellectual property rights is a double-edged sword: it stimulates innovations (advancement of culture) by rewarding the inventor (artist) only at a price of inhibiting the dissemination of inventions (works of art). Many authors have cast serious doubt upon the usefulness of stricter protection of IPR -intellectual property rights (see, for instance: Chang, 2001; Boldrin, Levine, 2002) .
May be the most powerful, persuasive and complete argument against intellectual property rights is made in a recent book "Against Intellectual Monopoly" by Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine -two American economists with very strong academic credentials (top 5% of the economists of the world). The full text of the book -in line with the authors' beliefs -was and is available online before and after its publication by the Cambridge University Press in July 2008 (Boldrin and Levine, 2008) . They come to the conclusion that in most cases intellectual property protection does more economic harm than good and ought to be eliminated.
On the one hand, the usual justification for the IPR protection -the need to stimulate the creation of intellectual products -is generally wrong and is not supported by evidence.
BOX. Boldrin and Levine: "If intellectual property is the Viagra of innovation, then it has been prescribed on the basis of the wrong diagnosis to a patient who is not impotent"
In a famous 1958 study on the economics of the patent system, the distinguished economist Fritz
Machlup concluded that
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
Almost fifty years later, the first half of this illustrious sentence is more valid than it has ever been. The other half is obsolete. At the time Machlup wrote his report the cancer that is intellectual property was detectable but its action seemed restricted to a few, possibly not vital, economic organs. Nowadays, this cancer is attacking the most vital centers of our economy: metastasis is near and so it is time to face the intellectual monopoly threat squarely, and to take action.
Intellectual monopoly apologists like to portray intellectual property as a cure, a powerful and beneficial medicine alleviating the innovative impotence of competitive markets. If intellectual property is the Viagra of innovation, then it has been prescribed on the basis of the wrong diagnosis to a patient who is not impotent. It may occasionally provide an initial spurt of innovational enthusiasm. Unfortunately, this subsides rather rapidly and is replaced by a rapacious desire to obtain economic satisfaction through the exclusion of as many people as possible from fruitful intellectual intercourse.
Source: Boldrin and Levine, 2008. Analogies with "piracy" and "stealing the product" are inappropriate because the owner/creator of the intellectual product, unlike the owner of the physical product, does not stop to possess it after it has been "pirated". What IPR protection does is not preventing "stealing", but providing the inventor/creator with the monopoly, which is generally a very primitive, inefficient and full of negative consequences way to stimulate inventions. It has been demonstrated that the creation of most intellectual products was not stimulated by the IPR protection and that these products would have been created anyway without any IPR protection because the creator always has the benefit of the first sale and the product cannot be copied instantly 2 .
Try to answer the simplest question: where is the line separating the results of fundamental research (that are considered to be a public good that should provided at the society's expense and should be free for all) and the results of applied research (which are made the property of the inventor for the period of the duration of the patent)?
Think about TCP protocols on which Internet is based. Most observers agree today that the early decision not to patent these protocols contributed to the rapid spread on Internet. It is generally agreed, for example, that had the TCP-protocols been patented, the proliferation of the Internet would proceed much more slowly. Sakakibara and Bransletter (2001) studied the 1998 Japanese patent law reforms and did not find any evidence of its positive impact. These and a number of other results "…raise the possibility that strengthened intellectual property rights have led to the socially wasteful accumulation of defensive patent portfolios." (Sakakibara and Bransletter, 2001, p. 99) .
The simultaneous deciphering of the genome by the The Human Genome Project that was an international scientific research project funded by governments and universities, and by a private Celera corporation that wanted to get patents for the particular genes, created a controversy in a scientific community. Is it fundamental research or applied research? And why the results of the applied research should be patented?
Patentability of genes has been legal since 1980. That year, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court found in favor of Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty, who used bacteria to engineer a microbe that dissolves oil. A striking 20 percent of all human genes have been patented.
However, now that all 20,000 to 25,000 human genes have been mapped and sequenced through the Human Genome Project, they are in the public domain, meaning they would no longer be considered "new" for the purposes of patents. Now, patents on human genes must specify a new use, such as a diagnostic test (Landau, 2009) .
2 "…The initial print run for Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince was reported to be 10.8 million hardcover copies. So we can realistically conclude that if J. K. Rowling were forced to publish her book without the benefit of copyright, she might reasonably expect to sell the book to a publishing house for several million dollars -or more. This is certainly quite a bit less money than she earns under the current copyright regime. But it seems likely, given her previous occupation as a part-time French teacher, that it would still give her adequate incentive to produce her great works of literature." (Boldrin, Levine, 2008) .
Why patents should be granted to companies that invent something, but largely at the expense of the taxpayers, and that are using the results of previous fundamental research and direct government funding as a supplement to their own research funds? In the US in the most R&D intensive pharmaceutical industry only 43% of funding for research comes from companies themselves, whereas 29% -from the state National Health Institute and the rest -from charitable foundations (Chang, 2001, p.31 In short, it is important to recognize that the current system of protection of intellectual property is very primitive and inefficient even from the point of view of developed countries themselves. There are political economy factors that explain why this sub-optimal system still exists (small organized groups, powerful lobbies, are more successful in pushing the government to pursue policies consistent with their interests than large unorganized groups, like the society as a whole).
Second, even if there is a need to protect intellectual property rights, there is no reason to force developing countries to protect them as strictly as developed countries do. There seems to be an agreement that the accelerated development of the poor countries is a priority for the world and for the rich countries in particular (since it reduces the threat of terrorism, for example).
And there seems to be a consensus among economists and policymakers that the transfer of 3 This system existed in centrally planned economies (former communist countries) and contributed to technical progress. The problem was that this strength was far outweighed by other weakness -the lack of appropriate stimuli for innovations: enterprises were not interested in introducing new products and technologies because this contradicted the main performance evaluation criteria -meeting the production quota. Stopping the plant for reconstruction in order to introduce new technologies and new products at the expense of not meeting the production quota was not a preferable option for the manager (Shmelev, Popov, 1989 ).
technology to the poor countries is the most efficient way of assistance. Yet, the TRIPs agreements are undoubtedly limiting the transfer of technology to the South.
There is a large body of literature that emerged in recent years and that questions the universality of recipes for optimal economic policy in developed and developing countries.
Simply put, this literature states that what may be good for developed countries is not necessarily good for countries that are farther away from the technological frontier and are catching up with developed nations 4 . One of such areas is the protection of intellectual property rights -here Western regulatory requirements are perceived to be too strict for poorer countries.
The argument is that most Western countries 100 years ago did not have either laissez faire markets, or today's strict standards of protection of intellectual property rights. Advocating the acceptance of these standards in less wealthy parts of the world, and even threatening developing countries with economic sanctions in case they refuse to accept such standards, the West, whatever the good intentions may be, de facto undermines the competitiveness of poorer countries and preserves their backwardness. There are even accusations of double standard (when the West was industrializing, it was not maintaining these standards) and "kicking away the ladder" (after the West got rich through exploitation of colonies and child labor, it does everything to slow down the growth of "the other world"; Chang, 2002) .
It has been suggested that trade negotiators are "captured" by industry and that intellectual property policies can become overprotective, even if trade policy negotiators are equally concerned with all domestic interests, those of both consumers and producers, because intellectual property is the only available tool by which cross-border externalities can be recaptured by the innovating country. To a trade policy negotiator, profit earned abroad is unambiguously a good thing, and the consumers' surplus conferred on foreign consumers does not count at all (Scotchmer, 2003) . Whatever the reasons are, TRIPS are making it more difficult for the poor countries to develop not only in economic, but also in social terms.
Copyrights hinder the dissemination of information, knowledge and culture, whereas patents on pharmaceutical products limit the ability of the poor countries to fight diseases and decrease mortality. It is only in cases of national emergency, such as a really bad AIDS epidemic in the South of Africa, that drugs can be purchased/produced with no regard to patent protection. To an extent piracy alleviates these problems, which is the rationale to talk not about costs of piracy, but about the benefits of piracy and the costs of stricter IPR protection. developing countries took on as legal obligation a cost of USD 60 billion per year, but there is no legal obligation in the agreement on any member to provide anything in exchange (Finger, 2002) . World Bank report (2002) estimates that the net annual increase in patent rents resulting from TRIPS for the top six developed countries in this field will be USD 40 billion (with the top beneficiaries being the United States with USD 19 billion, Germany USD 6.8 billion, Japan USD 5.7 billion, France USD 3.3 billion, United Kingdom USD 3 billion and Switzerland USD 2 billion). Developing countries that will incur major annual net losses include South Korea (USD 15.3 billion), China (USD 5.1 billion), Mexico (USD 2.6 billion), India (USD 903 million) and Brazil (USD 530 million). In addition, there are financial and human resource costs for administering and enforcing IP laws and policies, requiring law reform, enforcement agencies and legal expertise that have to be borne by the developing country. each, whereas all developing countries -only for 6.3% (Shashikant, 2005) .
By way of comparison, official development assistance of Western countries to developing countries ODA in 2001 was less than $60 billion and only in recent years, after 9/11 terrorist attack has increased to over $100 billion.
Recently WIPO's Japan Office concluded a major study of the economic impact of IP systems in six Asian countries -China, India, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Vietnam (WIPO, 2007) . The reports examined the impact of the IP system on areas such as research and development, foreign direct investment and technology transfer. The research results indicate a positive correlation between the strengthening of the IP system and subsequent economic growth.
Other studies, however, do not find evidence that stricter patent protection contributed to technical progress and growth. Switzerland, for instance, experienced a peak in the innovation activity in late 19 th century, when the national Patent law was non-existent or very weak (Chang, 2001 ). The surveys of the US companies suggest that most of them would have been financing the innovation activities in any case -whether the results of these activities would have been protected by patents or not. They claimed that the most important protection of their intellectual products results not from formal patents, but from their technological leadership that makes it impossible for the competitors to replicate their products/technologies for years, if not for decades (Chang, 2001) .
Some authors even find that increased patent protection leads to less innovation. "We find evidence that patents substitute for R&D effort at the firm level; they are associated with lower R&D intensity. The results suggest that stronger patents may have facilitated entry by firms in niche product markets, while spawning "patent portfolio races" among capital-intensive firms (Bessen and Hunt, 2003; Hall and Ham, 1999, -cited in Boldrine and Levine, 2008) .
Econometric analysis of Japanese and U.S. patent data on 307 Japanese firms finds no evidence of an increase in either R&D spending or innovative output that could plausibly be attributed to patent reform (Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001 ).
Boldrine and Levine (2008) in chapter 8 examine the intensity of creation of classical music before and after the introduction of the European copyright laws (around the end of the 18th century, first in Britain, then in continental Europe). They find that "the number of composers per million declined everywhere, but it declined considerably faster in the UK after the introduction of copyright than in Germany or Austria, and at about the same rate as Italy. So there is no evidence here that copyright increased musical output… Whatever the mechanism affecting composers' incentives, copyright protection was not an important part of it".
BOX: Did copyright law stimulate the musical genius of Giuseppe Verdi?
The 
History of Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Britain was the first country to adopt a patent law in 1623, although the use of patents (privileges to inventors of new arts and machines) can be traced to 15 th century Venice and 16 th century
Saxony. The popular view though is that the British patent law did not really exist before the revision of 1852 (Chang, 2002) .
The US legal protection of intellectual property goes back to the Jefferson-Madison debates over the constitution (Thibadeau, 2004) . England in early XIX century was the only country with patent and copyright laws. There was a notion of ownership of Literature (Copyright) and Art (Patents). The terms "copyright" and "patent" were in use. However, in England, these Intellectual Properties were protected as ordinary property, owned for life and heirs. Jefferson was arguing vigorously against the English in-perpetuity model that Madison seems to not have much of a problem with (Thibadeau, 2004 -until 1968 , in Japan -until 1976 , in Spain -until 1992 . And medical drugs became patentable in Germany and France in 1967, in Italy -in 1979, in Spain and  Canada -in the 1990s (Chang, 2002) .
BOX: "Happy Birthday to You!" If you sing it publicly, you are a pirate!
The melody of "Happy Birthday to You" comes from the song "Good Morning to All", which was written and composed by American sisters Patty Hill and Mildred J. Hill in 1893.
[3] They were both kindergarten school teachers in Louisville, Kentucky, developing various teaching methods at what is now the Little Loomhouse. The sisters created "Good Morning to All" as a song that would be easy to sing by young children. The combination of melody and lyrics in "Happy Birthday to You" first appeared in print in 1912, and probably existed even earlier.
[7]
None of these early appearances included credits or copyright notices. Did technical progress stopped in countries that were latecomers to patenting and copyrighting business? It does not seem to be the case. The general argument of the defenders of IPR is that developed countries are on the edge of the technical progress, spend more on R&D than others, and hold the lion's share of all patents in the world because they have stricter protection of IPR. But if one accounts for the better quality of institutions, the positive relationship disappears; i.e. we cannot tell with certainty, whether it is the good institutions that promote technical progress or the system of protection of IPR. The reason is that the IPR index is very much correlated with the government effectiveness WB index ( fig. 2 ) and other measures of the institutional quality. Hence, if one uses the government effectiveness index as a measure of the quality of the institutions, the correlation with the per capita GDP would be even better than that of IPR protection index ( fig. 3 ).
Later I report regressions showing that the effect of IPR protection on growth, the level of development (GDP per capita), and R&D expenditure as a % of GDP disappears, if one controls for the quality of institutions. Opponents of the Bono Act consider the legislation to be corporate welfare and have tried (but failed) to have it declared unconstitutional, claiming that such an act is not "necessary and proper" to accomplishing the Constitution's stated purpose of "promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts". They argue that most works bring most of the profits during the first few years and are pushed off the market by the publishers thereafter. Thus there is little economic incentive in extending the terms of copyrights except for the few owners of franchises that are wildly successful, such as Disney. They also point out that the Tenth Amendment can be construed as placing limits on the powers that Congress can gain from a treaty. More directly, they see two successive terms of approximately 20 years each (the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Bono Act) as the beginning of a "slippery slope" toward a perpetual copyright term that nullifies the intended effect and violates the spirit of the "for limited times" language of the United States Constitution, Article I, section 8, clause 8.
Another argument against the Bono Act is an "offshore production" argument: that, for example, derivative works could be created outside the United States in areas where copyright would have expired, such works advancing science or the useful arts, and that US law would prohibit these works to US residents. For example, a movie of Mickey Mouse playing with a computer could be legally created in Russia and children worldwide could possibly benefit from watching it, but the movie would be refused admission for importation by US Customs because of copyright, resulting in a deprivation to American children. The first Winnie-the-Pooh book was published in 1926 and would have been public domain in 2001.
Source: Wikipedia.
Protection of IPR, economic growth and computerization -cross-country comparison
It may seem that protection of IPR stimulates growth: after controlling for the usual variables Even though the average number of software programs per computer (or movies per video rental shop and per TV) is a rather arbitrary estimate, the procedure is reasonable and probably the best possible way to estimate the magnitude of "piracy". But unfortunately, the detailed methodology is not published; the biggest unknown, which does not allow checking the IIPA piracy estimates, is the data on the legal supply of software, which are evaluated by the IDC (a global market intelligence and consulting firm) collecting the confidential information from the US companies 9 . Another problem is that prices of software sold to different countries are different, so even the knowledge of total revenues from export of software by US companies without the information about prices does not allow estimating the volume of exports of software.
7 Methodology (2008).
8 "To obtain the number of software units for each type of hardware platform, including those running software on Windows and those running software on non-Windows operating systems, IDC surveyed consumers and business in 15 countries: China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Spain, Romania, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Kuwait, and the United States. The results of these surveys were used to populate our input models for the other countries" (Methodology, 2008).
9 "Legitimate software shipments are determined by dividing the software revenues in a country by the average system value (ASV) for that country. Software revenues are captured annually in 60+ countries by IDC software analysts around the world. Revenues are gathered from interviews with suppliers in the country and cross-checked with global numbers and financial statements. For the countries not normally covered by IDC, the data were either collected in-country or modeled regionally out of our rest-of-region estimates. Software revenues are gathered by type -such as application, infrastructure, and development tools -and by software running on Windows and nonWindows operating systems. It was also allocated to software running on new systems bought during the year and on systems that were already in place" (Methodology, 2008) .
What is possible to do, however, is to check the consistency of IIPA data with the other publicly available statistics. This exercise produces results that put the IIPA estimates into question or suggests that IPR protection does not determine the levels of piracy . Controlling for the level of economic developments, the number of PCs, and the size of the country as measured by population and total GDP, losses from piracy (in billion dollars) and piracy levels (losses as a % of GDP) in most instances appear to be not correlated with the IPR protection indices. Assuming that IIPA estimates are accurate, this could happen, if piracy levels are determined not by IPR protection legislation and institutions, but by the strategy of the producers of intellectual products: in low developed small countries with few PCs they are not interested in enforcement of anti-piracy measures, but in capturing their emerging market, whereas in more developed large countries with a lot of PCs fighting piracy turns out to be more profitable.
On face value, IIPA data look reasonable. There is an apparent and very intuitive correlation with the total losses from piracy (illegal imports of software -business and entertainment, music, films, books) and total PPP (purchasing power parity) GDP, as well as total number of PCs in a country (figs. 5, 6). There is a theory that poorer countries (in the earliest stages of development) are interested in strong protection of IPR in order to attract FDI. As these countries develop and approach the level of middle income states they weaken the IPR regime to allow dissemination of imported technologies. As they continue to grow and approach the technological frontier, they become more interested in "home-made" innovations than in imitation and strengthen the IPR regime (Chen and Puttitanun, 2005) . Hence, there should be a U-shape relationship between the level of development and the IPR protection (high for poor countries, low for middle income countries, and high for developed countries) and some studies actually find this kind of relationship (Chen and Puttitanun, 2005 , find it for the panel data on 62 developing countries for the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000) . The U-shape relationship between IPR protection and the level of GDP per capita implies that there should be an inverted U-shape relationship between the piracy levels and GDP per capita.
The chart above has only 6 points for countries with per capita GDP higher than 50% of the US level (Saudi Arabia, Korea, Israel, Italy, Canada, Kuwait) and cannot be taken as sufficient evidence. And the IPR protection index from the Global Competitiveness Report exhibits a straightforward positive relationship with the level of GDP per capita, or even inverted U-shape relationship, not the U-shape relationship ( fig. 8 ).
In fact studies that reveal this U-shape relationship are based on GP index -Ginarte and Park index (Ginarte and Park, 2007 ) that accounts for (1) , but does not coincide with it on a one-to-one basis. Besides, it was argued that "well-known U-shape between IPRs and per capita GDP is instead a result of cross-country differences. Crosssectionally, the least developed countries are less able and willing to stand up against international pressures to implement strong patent rights, while middle-income developing countries have a greater ability to oppose such pressures and, therefore, implement weaker patent rights" (Briggs, 2007) . Finally, the U-shape relationship implies that poor countries, as they develop, will lower the protection of IPR, which is not observed in reality. For particular markets the levels of piracy are generally negatively correlated with per capita GDP, although this relationship is stronger for business software and music, and weaker for films and entertainment software (figs 9-12).
It is also seemingly logical that the levels of piracy estimated by IIPA are negatively correlated with the IPR protection index from Global Competitive Report computed from surveys of the executives ( fig. 13 ). Regressions for the losses from piracy in the particular markets -businesses software, films, entertainment software, books and music are not reported here, but are available on request.
Similar relationships can be observed, when dependent variable is not the total losses from piracy, but piracy levels. There is no negative relationship between the index of protection of IPR and the total level of illegal imports as a % of GDP ( fig. 14) . There is some positive relationship in fact, although it is not statistically significant.
Controlling for the size of the total GDP, for the non-linear dependence on the level of economic development (GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared), and for the growth of the number of PCs in 1995-2005, allows to obtain a significant negative relationship between piracy level and IPR protection:
PIRlevTOT2005=7.7*10 -15 GDPppp05-0.00003Ycap05_USsq+0.003Ycap05_US - Running regressions for the piracy levels at particular markets (business software, music, films, entertainment software) as a dependent variable, produces mixed results. For business software and for musical products it appears that stricter IPR protection reduces the levels of piracy, whereas for films and entertainment software the IPR protection coefficients are positive and insignificant (regressions not reported here, but available on request).
To sum up, it appears that losses from piracy (in billion dollars) and piracy levels (as a % of GDP) that are estimated by the IIPA are not always correlated with IPR protection indices after controls are used for the level of economic developments, the number of PCs, and the size of the country as measured by population and total GDP. Assuming that IIPA data for piracy are accurate, it remains to be concluded that the strictness of protection of IPR does not influence the levels of piracy. These latter are determined first and foremost by the level of development and the size of the country, by the number and the rates of growth of PCs, whereas the IPR protection indices do not provide any additional explanatory power. Fig. 15 shows that the residual piracy levels (after controls for the GDP per capita, population, GDP and number of PCs) are not correlated at all with the IPR protection. .06
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The interpretation of this finding could be consistent with the well-documented observation that the strategy of producers of intellectual products is not always aimed at fighting piracy. When the country is at the low level of development and does not have a lot of PCs and is small, producers can maximize profit by turning their back on piracy and by pricing their products at a discount in order to capture the market. On the contrary, in relatively developed countries with a lot of PCs and large domestic market, fighting piracy is a more promising strategy for producers -it yields greater benefits per unit of efforts.
It could be hypothesized that the strategy of the producers of the intellectual products is twofold:
(1) to build legal and administrative capacity for the protection of IPR in developing countries,
(2) to retain the right to decide whether to use this capacity or not (in poor small countries with small number of PCs fighting piracy undermines long-term profits of producers).
Conclusions
It was demonstrated that strict protection of IPR can have a negative effect on economic development. Regression of economic growth on these indices produces conventional results (positive effect of stricter protection of IPR on growth) only if indices of institutional capacity (government effectiveness, control over corruption) are not included into the right hand side. If they are included, they kill the effect of IPR protection (because they are very much correlated with the IPR protection indices), so it is hardly possible to separate the effects of stricter IPR protection from the impact of the general strength of institutions.
Losses from piracy and piracy levels that are estimated by the IIPA are not always correlated with IPR protection indices after controls are used for the level of economic developments, the number of PCs, and the size of the country as measured by population and total GDP.
Assuming that IIPA data for piracy are accurate, it turns out that the strictness of protection of IPR does not influence the levels of piracy. These latter are determined first and foremost by the level of development and the size of the country, by the number and the rates of growth of PCs, whereas the IPR protection indices do not provide any additional explanatory power.
To sum up, there is no evidence that IPR protection stimulates R&D and promotes economic growth. But there is evidence that it inhibits the spread of new technologies. With stricter protection of IPR developing countries are not able to acquire the needed amount of intellectual products in the West. The global South is a net importer of intellectual products, so it looses from the need to pay for patents and copyrights (mostly to the West) and does not gain anything or gains very little from the rewards that are appropriated by inventors and artists (because the intellectual product industry is mostly in the West).
If it is accepted that growth and development of the Southern countries is a global priority, if
Western countries find it worthwhile to provide assistance to development, then it is logical and reasonable to make the next step: the most efficient way to help Southern countries to develop is not to provide aid, but to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, technology and culture to the South. This goal can be best achieved by decriminalizing piracy, eliminating the IPR at least for the Southern countries, and even more so -by promoting and subsidizing the transfer of intellectual products from the West to the South.
